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1
Continental Spy Nathan Hale, standing below the gallows, spoke to his British captors
with nothing less than unequivocal patriotism: “I only regret that I have but one life to lose for
my country.”1 American History idolizes Hale as a hero. His bravery as the first pioneer of
American espionage willing to sacrifice his life for the growing colonial sentiment against a
daunting global empire vindicates this. Yet, behind Hale’s success as an operative on
British-controlled Long Island, lies a narrative buried under the glorified heroism of warfare.
Was his skill an exception to most early American spies? How did Commander-in-Chief George
Washington protect the successors to Hale’s work? Why was espionage so vital to the Patriot
military strategy?2 Although the first American spy met a sorrow end, his sacrifice brought a
learning experience for the Continental army’s use of espionage; his work ignited a military
interest in espionage that presupposed the first colonial spy networks. Despite early American
Revolutionary War spies being inexperienced, inept, and counterproductive, their limited success
in acquiring invaluable intelligence still induced a political desire for the Continental Army to
improve professional espionage networks into a military weapon vital to overcome British
imperial forces.
The American War for Independence was as ideological, as it was physical.3 The first
signs of colonial animosity came as complaints to the Westminster Parliament for providing little
representation for the thirteen colonies. Amid a frenzy of failing royal dominions and laws
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restraining westward expansion instituted by King George III, American colonists used English
Common Law to argue against such regulations, referring to the Magna Carta’s guaranteed
justice to all subjects in a colonial charter.4 The role of taxes in sparking conflict extended far
beyond artificially bloated sugar and paper costs. Before the revolution, most poll and property
taxes were mandated by municipal governments; people voted directly on local ballots where
their opinions were well-represented. These regional taxes often led to tangible improvements.5
Near the start of the war, a sudden increase in Parliamentary imposts led Colonists to demand a
greater representation in the British government, especially on colonial policies. Unsatisfied with
the subtle role that Parliament was willing to offer, many Colonists developed a grave distrust
with their rulers.6
As distrust evolved into violence, Britain sent imperial soldiers to sequester the American
Patriots attempting to undermine imperial rule. In response, a coalition of colonial governments
known as the Continental Congress appointed George Washington to lead military forces against
the British army. Washington’s tenure as a British Major during the Seven Years’ War had
taught him how stark miscalculations could prove detrimental in battle.7 At Fort Duquesne,
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3
British spies informed his fellow officers that incoming French forces were small and
ill-equipped. The reports, being widely inaccurate, almost resulted in his own death. As a result,
Washington emphasized "[t]he necessity of procuring good [i]ntelligence”8 in developing a
military strategy intended to evade and tire the enemy. He established several intelligence circles
during the revolutionary war to track incoming British forces, drawing from political diplomats,
soldiers, and smugglers to conduct espionage. In addition, Washington involved himself in
communication between independent spies, eventually transferring this responsibility to a formal
military organization in the United States9. The British expected a short conflict; but the Patriots'
new espionage capabilities extended the war by several bloody years, gradually shifting
momentum towards the rebellion.
Washington began constructing a system for American espionage near the onset of the
first Revolutionary War battles. However, his vision would not truly come to fruition before
years of costly blunders. In 1777, The Battle of Brandywine exemplified how poor
communication and inexperienced strategy made early American spies problematic and
unreliable. The task was simple. Washington stationed his soldiers across the Brandywine Bank
to prevent any British forces from crossing the river. The bank presented an optimal natural
defense and was only believed to be crossable through two small bridges capable of trapping the
incoming British regiment. Washington tasked his spies to analyze the natural landscape, observe
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British troop movements, and track any flanking forces. He would soon learn, however, that they
were incapable. Colonel Theodorick Bland, who “[had] the duty of ascertaining where the creek
could be forded, . . . performed it ill,”10 missing shallow routes along the river that allowed the
British to stage a surprise attack. As the enemy approached, Washington received contradictory
letters from both Colonel Hazen, claiming that the northern bridge was empty, and John
Sullivan, urging Washington to redirect forces to meet a significant northern threat. Several
Continental officers also disregarded the timeframe of when certain spies reported information as
it was soon discovered that Colonel Hazen’s report was outdated from the prior morning. What
resulted was a disastrous showing from the Continental Army with Washington and his military
division nearly being captured. While the loss may seem to fall on Washington who, using the
inaccurate intelligence, failed to reinforce his vulnerable right flank from a surprise British
attack, many historians have analyzed the severity of the colonial spies’ mistakes. Ultimately, the
battle itself had not been comparatively devastating with most American soldiers successfully
retreating.11 However, the psychological toll on Washington must have been dramatic. In the
commander’s eyes, witnessing his spies mislead the military officers and jeopardize the rest of
the army would build significant distrust with future espionage reports. These espionage failures
likely brought memories of Fort Duquesne, where many of his men had died from avoidable
misinformation. Just as Nathan Hale’s successful reports inspired Washington to further invest in
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5
espionage, it would seem that these dramatic failures would emphasize the need for better spies
as well.
Unfortunately for the Continental Army, the incident at Brandywine became a norm than
an anomaly. Reporting errors and miscommunication would prolong well into the first half of the
war. Many of the first independent Colonial spies were citizen volunteers with an interest in an
independent United States. As amateur espionage artists inexperienced in military tactics, their
impact is often diluted in modern history books by the achievements of a few knowledgeable
exceptions.12 Washington expresses his overt frustration with these early spies in several
classified letters which likely prompted his concerted effort to find more capable spies. As a
locum tenens to an intelligence organization that could sift between inaccurate reports,
Washington was originally the executive interpreter of spy reports, relying on his own military
experience to verify estimations on British troop sizes and battalion movements. He shared this
avid doubt about one particular spy’s report in a 1779 letter to the then-Second Continental
Regiment Major Benjamin Tallmadge, writing:
The enemy’s force up the River as now exceeding 8000 men, but as I know he is mistaken if
he comprehends their whole force, I should be
glad if his successor was cautioned against
giving positive numbers by guess.13
At the end of the letter, Washington notes of a “successor” to the current era of independent spies
which reveals why Tallmadge was the recipient. This letter prefaced the development of
12
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Tallmadge’s Culper Spy Ring, which would replace the nebulous reports of independent spies
with an elaborate system intended to better identify and enumerate British forces across the
northern and central colonies. In his writing, Washington does not describe the successor in
detail, leading many historians to believe that he was not entirely sure what would supersede the
current system. The letter does, however, reveal several emerging realities. As the war
progressed, Washington likely stopped using his own judgement in interpreting intelligence as
his decisions could not prevent the Patriot’s early losses at Philadelphia and New York.14 Yet
Washington believed that good intelligence was paramount to turn the war around. Therefore,
the early spy reports, barring their issues, had been valuable enough to maintain his political
support. This would have fueled his desire to seek skilled professionals and plead with sceptics
that a successful spy network would reap dividends to the struggling Continental army. Of
course, this would be no easy task as the early battles provided a grim outlook for a general
hoping to outsmart a superior enemy.
Where Washington struggled early as a general, he excelled as a political diplomat.
Establishing elaborate professional spy rings was difficult, as the level of secrecy would pose
spies as both traitors to the Patriotic public and enemies to the empire. Prior to 1778,
Washington’s original spies were typically too amateur and stationary to infiltrate far past enemy
lines. He was also burdened with Loyalists15 consistently infiltrating previous networks, resulting
in the deaths of several American spies. In response, Washington ensured that new spy rings
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would operate unknown to local governments and prepared a plan in the case that his men were
discovered. This proved critical in New Jersey, where American spies were determined to hunt
down smugglers of British goods attempting to undermine a public boycott. Early in the war,
Lieutenant Lewis J. Costigan, posed as a Loyalist 1st New Jersey Regiment soldier to spy on
smuggling operations near the coast. The state government, which had previously discovered
Washington’s spies, despised their services for complicating the state’s effort to combat the
issue. The spies needed the smugglers to remain operational to discover who was responsible,
while the New Jersey government wanted to eliminate the illegal trade due to its economic
consequence of inflating the local currency. Faced with this conflict, Costigan had to leave his
operations because state officials could “detain [him] as a prisoner of war.” However,
Washington continued operations in New Jersey, with Colonel Elias Dayton’s ring of spies
posing as smugglers supplying British ships, “running so many undercover missions and dealing
in such abundance of provisions and goods that their activities became suspicious to the local
authorities.”16 Eventually, the New Jersey government uncovered their operations and arrested
them. Washington quickly negotiated with the New Jersey governor to take the spies into
Continental hands without compromising their identities. Prior to this conflict, there were few
cases of spies being saved during the war. In fact, the early Continental Army would not have
had the talent or resources to extract a spy in hostile territory. Washington actively sought to
keep his men from the state courtroom, the first instance where the national government
successfully protected their espionage networks. Whether Washington was protecting spies for
his grand vision for an espionage network is unclear. Perhaps, it may have been to keep the

16

Nagy, Secret Spy War, 123-148.

8
operation hidden or out of compassion to ensure his men would not share a similar fate to
Nathan Hale. Although Washington’s true motive remains unknown, his political investment in
protecting his spies transformed American espionage into a federally supported network
spanning across all thirteen colonies.
However, Washington was not the only major political figure aware of these spy circles.
A proponent of espionage, Benjamin Franklin conducted intelligence responsibilities in Europe
which became vital in turning French sentiment towards the American cause. Printing European
newspapers propagating the long, costly investment of the war, Franklin was able to sway public
opinion on the revolution. His work not only turned the British citizens against Parliament’s
determination to capture the Patriot rebels, but exaggerated the atrocities committed on the
colonists to incite French support against their historical adversaries.17 Franklin’s foreign success
certainly could have developed favoritism toward Washington’s spies. A polymath to new ideas,
Franklin would have understood the benefit that an advanced American espionage network could
contribute during the war; his willingness to use extreme tactics in Europe, some of which
considered immoral in contemporary eyes, taught him the potential of advanced espionage. His
direct relationship with George Washington greatly influenced wartime decisions, and it would
be completely plausible that he offered political guidance to the Commander’s vision for
American spy networks. How much Franklin knew about the individual colonial spies is
relatively unknown, however, his conversations with state governments in permitting federal spy
operations later in the war shows an overt support for the espionage organizations that had
already existed. Franklin provided additional political advocacy and potentially may have
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encouraged Benjamin Tallmadge’s spy ring to use false propaganda to convert Loyalists to favor
independence.
By 1779 when the Culper Spy Ring evolved into the primary espionage network across
New England, the stifled British attack in Saratoga left the war in a prolonged stalemate.18
Military generals along with Tallmadge were desperate for momentum. Coincidentally, the
Culper Spy Ring’s rapid success in the later half of the war happened as the course of the war
shifted toward Patriot resilience. How the Culper Ring came about was from a selective
recruiting method that sought the most capable colonists, regardless of an incriminating
background. This was the drastic extent that the Tallmadge was willing to take in building his
network.
Abraham Woodhull, more famously known undercover as Samuel Culper, was an early
example of the talent Benjamin Tallmadge strenuously sought in building the Culper Spy Ring.
Once a farmer who smuggled his crops “across Long Island Sound to British-held New York to
sell his farm’s produce”19 at a higher price, Woodhull developed his elusiveness and deception
for profit, supplying the British with a source of food. Ironically, Woodhull would be caught by
Patriot state officials and imprisoned for treason. This was where Benjamin Tallmadge,
impressed with Woodhull’s sly crime, asked him to join his spy ring. Woodhull would take the
name of Samuel Culper and become a successful American spies, publicly taking oath in

18

“Revolutionary War,” History, A&E Television Networks, last modified October 29,

2009,
https://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/american-revolution-history#section_4.
Michael Schellhammer, “Abraham Woodhull: The Spy Named Samuel Culper,” People
Archives, Journal of the American Revolution, last modified May 19, 2014,
https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/05/abraham-woodhull-the-spy-named-samuel-culper/.
19

10
Setauket to fake his devotion to King George III. Tallmadge and Woodhull would go on to
recruit other talented candidates to the circle such as Robert Townshend. For historians,
characterizing people in espionage history is difficult as truth can easily be lost in the evidence.
American history books treat Woodhull as a hero to the American cause. Yet he still committed a
serious crime and had his true work never been revealed, he would have been remembered as an
opportunistic smuggler. Tallmadge understood the risk of recruiting criminals, but he wanted the
Culper Spy Ring to be a momentous force against the British. Utilizing skilled colonists who
smuggled goods to avoid British taxes before the war produced an organization with a prowess
for espionage. Ultimately, he was able to build a talented weapon for Washington to use in
changing the tide of battle.
The Culper Ring did not only improve through talent. Tallmadge also implemented a
system that used unique identities to extend the circle’s outreach to different communities.
Robert Townshend fabricated a life as a Loyalist coffee shop owner; Anna Strong acted as a
neutral wife who relayed messages through hanging clothing; Austin Roe posed as a horseman
who brought messages over long distances.20 The entire spy circle worked as an elaborate
communication line to bring information swiftly back to Washington. As the organization
became increasingly sophisticated, Washington brought new investments and technologies such
as invisible ink and coded schedules to improve communication.21 This was the final step that
improved the Culper Spy Ring into the effective weapon Washington envisioned. The swift,
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professional coordination in the Culper Spy Ring fared better than the problematic reports of
independent spies from several different sources. As shown by the conflict in Brandywine, a
small system that could only provide reports from close proximity was dramatically less helpful
to Washington. Now that he had access to rapid information even for incidents as far as New
York, Washington could organize larger surprise attacks, draw British soldiers into a perpetual
pursuit, and eventually trap them in Yorktown to end the war.
Even before the tragic hanging of America’s first spy, Nathan Hale, in 1776,
Washington’s military strategy was clear: to “outmaneuver and outperform superior British
forces.”22 This strategy, built on deceptive movement instead of brute strength, drew a demand
for effective spies that proved integral to the colonists’ victory. From an objective perspective,
the American victory was close to miraculous. The Continental Army had fewer guns, men,
funds, and ships, the initial public sentiment in Britain deeply favored smothering the rebellion,
and less than half of the colonists demanded independence. In the context of Western History,
there was little statistical difference between the American Revolution and other colonial revolts
such as the Battle of Plassey or the British Annexation of India; but what became the first
successful colonial rebellion against a European empire was ideologically and politically distinct
from its predecessors.2324
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The inexperienced, inept, and counterproductive colonial spies that served early in the
war were rarely successful; but their intelligence reports, though often inaccurate, provided
enough benefit to spark a desire among political and military commanders to establish and
improve advanced espionage networks that shifted the war in favor of the American Patriots.
From the disaster in Brandywine to the successes of the Culper Spy Ring, the potential of
American espionage was always present in the eyes of George Washington, encouraging him to
further invest in espionage and use political power to protect his spies. His initial reliance on
“subordinates to scout and report back with information” resulted in many “inaccurate reports
[and] early defeats.”25 However, that same reliance, when shifted to professional spy circles,
aided in his cunning military prowess, elusive techniques, and diplomacy with France. His feat
was impressive, both in the eyes of Loyalists astonished that “he with his banditti [could] keep
General Howe dancing from one town to another . . . with such an army as he has”26 and modern
historians who label the first President as a spymaster. Of course, this unfairly undermines the
deserved credit to the spies who mastered eighteenth century espionage in one rebellion. With
the growing discoveries of letters and codebooks, historians have developed a better
understanding of the spies who relayed information to and from Washington’s command. These
artifacts which remain far rarer than Washington’s personal records have shifted the interest of
the modern field towards how the first American spies, as citizens or volunteer militia, conducted
their work. After all, the Culper Spy Ring rose through the acts of individuals, rephrasing the
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collective American identity by shifting the art of deception from smuggling trade to gathering
information. Individual bravery breeds collective innovation at the cost of sacrifice. As Nathan
Hale has shown, it is this sacrifice that moves people, organizations, and countries forward.
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